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ABSTRACT 
The digital signature provides the signing message with functions like authentication, 
integration and non-repudiation. However, in some of the applications, the signature has 
to be verified only by specific recipients of the message and it should be hidden from the 
public. For achieving this, authenticated encryption systems are used. Authenticated 
Encryption schemes are highly helpful to send a confidential message over an insecure 
network path. In order to protect the recipients benefit and for ensuring non-repudiation, 
we help the receiver to change the signature from encrypted one to an ordinary one. With 
this we avoid any sort of later disputes. Few years back, Araki et al. has proposed a 
convertible authenticated scheme for giving a solution to the problem. His scheme 
enables the recipient to convert the senders signature into an ordinary one. However, the 
conversion requires the cooperation of the signer. In this thesis, we present a convertible 
authenticated encryption scheme that can produce the ordinary signature without the 
cooperation of the signer with a greater ease. Here, we display a validated encryption 
plan using message linkages used to convey a message. For the collector's advantage, the 
beneficiary can surely change the encrypted signature into an ordinary signature that 
which anyone can check. A few attainable assaults shall be examined, and the security 
investigation will demonstrate that none of the them can effectively break the proposed 
plan. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
There is a great need for security of information nowadays mainly during transmission. A 
few problems are harder to fathom than others as in producing an answer requires more 
resources, for example, time, space, energy, etc. Consequently, there exists a quantifiable 
"complexity gap" in the middle of problems, and it bodes well to recognize “easy” problems 
and “hard” problems. However, where complexity theory is all about quantifying and 
exploring the distinction between easy and hard problems, cryptography is all about 
exploiting it. All the more particularly, cryptography is the study of developments where a 
portion of the computations included are deliberately easy, while others are hard [1]. This 
sort of cryptography can offer various other services like 
Integrity - reassuring the recipient that the message has not been altered.  
Authentication - verifying someone‟s (or something‟s) identity. 
Confidentiality - Security from divulgence to unauthorized persons. 
Non-repudiation - Originator of communications can‟t deny it later. 
These are the essential security objectives a message passing framework must fulfill for an 
effective correspondence. Before, cryptography mostly concerned with the privacy 
component [2]. At that point, the most use of encryption was in the division of guard or 
other association to gather and report mystery data on a foe or contender. In the most recent 
decade, the other security objectives like respectability check, client validation, 
computerized marks and so forth have been added to the privacy component. Indeed in 
antiquated times cryptography was utilized on the premise of some basic figures like the 
Caesars figure and going the keys through a secured messenger framework [3]. 
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Introduction to Cryptography 
Strangely, cryptography is considered to be the art of secret writing. It‟s a science of 
utilizing the mathematics for encryption and decryption of data. Encryption helps us in 
storing the sensitive information or in transmitting the same across networks which are 
insecure such as the Internet. Then, it can be read only by the supposed person who receives 
it and nobody else. While cryptography is dealing with data security, cryptanalysis deals 
with analysis of secure communication and breaking it. Classical cryptanalysis includes a 
combination of mathematical tools and their applications, analytical reasoning, patience, 
pattern finding, luck and determination. Another name for the cryptanalysts is attackers. So, 
cryptology includes both cryptanalysis and cryptography. Here, we are using encryption 
where information is represented as numbers and then it is manipulated. Previously, people 
used symmetric key encryption, but it‟s too old now, because of much more advancements 
in this field and acquaintance with check of prime numbers generated.  Asymmetric 
cryptography is more popular nowadays [3]. Hence, cryptography is classified in two parts: 
Symmetric Key Cryptography 
Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
 
Symmetric Key Cryptography 
It is an encryption scheme in which the receiver and sender share a common key that is used 
for the decryption and encryption of the message. This system is simpler and faster, but the 
main disadvantage in this scheme is that the two parties must exchange the common key 
somehow or other very confidentially. It is also called as secret-key cryptography. Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) is a common example for this type of cryptography. In 
symmetric key cryptography let us suppose that the sender sends the message by encrypting 
with a key k and the receiver after receiving the encrypted message decrypts it with the same 
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common key k. The supposition is based upon the way that here, the sender and the 
beneficiary utilize the same key and the transmission of the message and the key of cipher 
text is done in an unreliable channel. This framework is defenseless and defective if the key 
k is spilled and it is known to the enemy [1]. 
 
Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
Asymmetric key is also known as public key cryptography. It is a kind of cryptography in 
which a instead of one, two keys are used to decrypt and encrypt the message to ensure its 
secure arrival. In the beginning, a user gets a public and private key pair from the certificate 
authority board. Any other network user interested in sending an encrypted message to the 
first user can get his public key from the public directory. Using this key, he has to ecrypt 
the message and then send to the recipient. After getting the message, the recipient decrypts 
it with his own private key, which no one else can access. We use asymmetric key 
cryptography in order to overcome the problems existing in symmetric key cryptography. It 
is same as the former with slight difference. Here, we have a pair of keys instead of one. 
Diffie and Hellman were the first to outline Asymmetric Key Cryptographic methods that 
are used for key agreement and are also used in application of other cryptographic problems 
[3]. Diffie and Hellman initially delineated the Public Key Cryptography strategy, which 
could be utilized for key agreement and had an application in the other cryptographic issues 
[3]. Diffie and Hellman did not give solid developments to how this idea of public-key 
cryptography could be complemented by and by. It was not until the major work of 
Adlemen, Shamir, and Rivest that the first public-key cryptosystem was acknowledged [4]. 
The idea of Public Key Cryptography was a major break-through in the field of Digital 
Signature. Digital signatures are similar to the signatures done on handwritten documents. 
They have the same properties of real signatures. They are easy to be produced but difficult 
to be forged. This was achieved by using the public key to encrypt and private key to 
  
4 
decrypt. With passage of time, several new inventions and developments came up and 
proved better than the older ones. 
 
Digital Signature 
For a document the most important security goal is its Authenticity. In the physical world 
conventionally  the signature  is included in the document as a part of it,  which is not  in 
case of digital  signature  as the  signer or the  sender sends the  message and  the  signature  
as two separate  documents  to the  receiver which receives both  documents  and  starts  the  
verification process of checking whether that  the signature  actually  belongs to the sender.  
If verified then the document is accepted else rejected.  Digital signature was proposed by 
Diffie and Hellmen for the first time [3]. We give a more accurate definition for the 
signature scheme which is based on [5]. The figure 1.1 is from [6]. 
 
Signature Scheme:  A signature scheme consists of these three algorithms of polynomial 
time:  
 Keygen (Key generation) algorithm:  For an input 1k , let k be a security parameter, 
it produces public and private keys, say (Kp, Ks). It forms a pair of keys. This algorithm is 
highly probabilistic one. 
 Signing algorithm:   This produces a signature, say S, when a message, M and a set 
of public and private keys are supplied to it. Let the set of keys be (Kp, Ks). This algorithm 
may be probabilistic and may receive some other inputs in other schemes. 
 Verification algorithm:  It checks whether S is the right signature for m 
corresponding to Kp or not when supplied with a message m and a signature S and a public 
key Kp. This algorithm not necessarily be probabilistic in nature. 
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Figure 1: Signature Scheme Diagram from [1] 
 
The digital signature paradigm only provides the Authenticity part of the security goal. To 
enhance the security to include Confidentiality along with the Authentic- ity we make use of 
both signature and encryption. It can be done in two separate simple steps of signing the 
document using some signing schemes and the encrypt- ing it based on some predefined 
encryption schemes. The various steps can be written as the follows; 
 Signing is done using a Public key DS (Digital Scheme) scheme. 
 With the help of an existing secret key encryption algorithm, encrypting the message 
m, along with the signature and this happens under chosen encryption key of a message. 
 Using the public key of receiver, encrypt the message encryption key once again. 
 Send the message. 
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Convertible Authenticated Encryption Scheme 
A convertible authenticated encryption scheme helps a sender to generate a cipher-text in 
such a way that only a specific receiver will be able to decrypt and verify it. So as to avoid 
later disputes because of repudiations this scheme helps the receiver to convert the signature 
from an encrypted one to an ordinary signature [2]. In 2009, Lee et al. came up with another 
Convertible Authenticated Encryption scheme which is based upon El-gamal‟s scheme, in 
2009. It also provides notions of security like integration, authentication, non-repudiation 
and confidentiality. In this scheme, the sender signs the message with an authenticated 
cipher-text signature. Only the receiver is enabled to decrypt the message using his own 
private key and thus verify the message with his own public key. If at all a dispute arises, the 
receiver will be capable of converting the cipher-text into an ordinary signature which is 
simple enough to be verified by one and all [4]. 
Convertible     
The word „Convertible‟ means the receipient can convert the encypted digital signature to an 
ordinary signature which anyone can verify. Even if the signature is repudiated by the 
signer, his dishonesty can be proved by the receipient with a great ease as the signature can 
be verified by anyone [6]. 
 
Discrete Logarithms 
In mathematics, suppose there is an equation bk=g, where b and g belong to a finite group, 
then an integer k which solves the above equation is referred to as discrete logarithm. Let b 
be the base of log and g be the element whose logarithm is being calculated. The discrete 
algorithms are finite-group theoretic analogue of simple ones that solve the equation with 
real numbers g and b. [8]. 
No efficient method is known till date, which can compute discrete logarithmic problems on 
conventional computers. Computing discrete log problems is quite difficult as per past 
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knowledge. Since there is no efficient solution for Discrete Logarithmic problems, many 
popular algorithms in public key cryptography have their security based upon this DLP. 
Let G be any group in general. Let multiplication be the group operation. Let g and b be any 
elements belonging to G. Suppose there is a solution k to solve the equation b
k
=g, then the 
integer k is called as discrete Logarithm of g with base b. As we know that k=logb(g). it is 
quite possible that no such discrete log exists based upon g and b, or that more than one 
solution exists. Suppose, H is a subgroup of G. In this case, H is cyclic group and for all g in 
H, we have integral logbg for sure. If H is infinite, the Discrete logarithm amounts to group 
isomorphism and then logb(g) is also unique [4]. 
log : .b H Z   
But if H is of finite size n, till modulo n  logbg is unique and the discrete logarithm results in 
a group isomorphism. 
log : .b nH Z  
Here Zn indicates the circle of integers modulo n. but the ordinary logarithms base change 
formula remains the same: If c is another generator of H, then 
log ( ) log ( ).log ( ).c c bg b g  
 
Message Linkages 
A complex message contains multiple message blocks which are linked with one another. If 
buffer size is not sufficient or when the message is extended  due to running processor  
,many  message blocks are created  in the message, as shown in Figure 1. When a message 
contains so many message blocks overall message type is determined by the first message 
type even if the type of attached message blocks are different. If the content of the buffer is 
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less than the original content of the message so many message blocks are formed in the 
message as shown in the diagram below. Suppose a large message say of 1000 kb then it is 
broken into small message bodies of size 100 kb, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Message linked blocks 
 
Need of the scheme and application 
This scheme which is authenticated encryption is filled with so many facilities like message 
authentication, integrity of the message and repudiation free message.  
Message authentication means to make the message like the originally provided with. 
Integrity means loyalty just like no unkown person is allowed to change the original 
message. 
Non-repudiation means the person who is signing should have a open view on the message 
coming afterwards. [1]. 
E-commerce has become a hub for online digital content transactions. They are growing at a 
very faster rate. For this to continue we have to take into account the sophisticated electronic 
payment schemes as well as high quality digital materials.[11].  The electronic cash schemes 
mdk mdk mdk 
dblk dblk dblk 
buffer buffer buffer 
b-cont b-cont 
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are able in order to pay e-cash to merchants for the customers  only due to privately 
protected communication networks. 
So there is a great challenge before the engineers to necessitate for the application of new 
electronic payment method with very powerful algorithms of cryptography and security that 
is going to replace paper based cash schemes in the generations to come. In 1983 the first 
electronic cash system was proposed by CHAUM[12]. 
 
Motivation 
In the scheme of Convertible Authenticated Encryption Scheme using message linkages, we 
observe that the complexity (such as computational cost and communication overhead) is 
very high for practical applications and sure enough there is a possibility to reduce it. So, we 
are interested in developing a convertible authenticated encryption scheme with message 
linkages with a low computational cost and communication overhead than the existing 
scheme. 
  
Objective 
To develop a new convertible authenticated scheme using message linkages with a low 
computational cost and communication overhead than the existing scheme. 
 
Work done so far 
In this thesis, we contribute the following: 
Implementation of the existing scheme: Convertible authenticated encryption scheme with 
message linkages. 
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Design of convertible authenticated encryption scheme with low computation cost and 
communication overhead. 
Implementation of the proposed scheme. 
Comparison and analysis between the two schemes. 
 
Organization of thesis 
In Chapter  2, we have given the literature survey which includes the review of a convertible 
authenticated encryption scheme. At the end we have given the mathematical preliminaries 
which have been used throughout the thesis. 
In Chapter 3, we have proposed our new convertible authenticated encryption scheme. Also 
the security analysis has been given in this chapter. 
In Chapter 4, we have shown all the implementation results. 
In Chapter 5 we provide conclusion of this thesis and future research directions. 
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CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first persons to put forward an idea about a scheme on digital signatures with discrete 
logarithm based message recovery technique were Nyberg and Rueppel [10, 13]. In order to 
decrease computational and communication costs of their method, Hoster et al. [4] proposed 
his scheme on authenticated encryption system, following which a number of such schemes 
were presented. In all of their methods, the signer would generate an encrypted signature  
and send it to the recipient. Once the signature is received, the recipient would verify the 
signature and generate the message. 
In the recent times, Tseng et al. [15] have presented two schemes based on an authenticated 
encryption system using message linkage with more efficiency. One is a general one which 
would allow the recipient to get back the message as soon as the partial signature is 
received. The second one is a basic scheme which is better than all the old schemes in 
comparision to communication overhead and computational costs. 
Further, consider the later dispute condition. For example, the signer repudiates. It means 
that he has actually signed the signature but he denies. In this way the recipient suffers from 
a danger of repudiation. He will be left helpless if he can‟t prove the dishonesty of the 
signer. He needs the help of others to do it. That means even others should be able to verify 
the scheme. It may be necessary to reveal the actual information along with its signature for 
verification. In a situation of later dispute, to protect the benefit of receiver, we have to 
enable the receiver to convert the signature into an ordinary one which anyone and everyone 
can verify. By this the receiver can prove the dishonesty of the sender as he will be able to 
expose his mischief. 
For this reason, Araki et al. [2] proposed a limited verifier method based on the convertible 
authenticated encryption scheme. However, it could fail in case of the signer is not ready to 
cooperate with the recipient. He actually signs the message but denies it. Hence, the 
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signature conversion would require another parameter from the sender. Then Wu and Hsu 
[15] proposed another scheme based on the same convertible encryption method. When the 
sender does repudiation with the signature in this scheme, the recipient would be able to 
prove his dishonesty as he can reveal the ordinary version of the original signature which 
anyone can verify without any need of cooperation of the signer.   
 
Review of Tseng et al.’s convertible authenticated encryption 
scheme 
In this section, we shall present the Tseng et al.‟s scheme: A convertible authenticated 
encryption scheme using message linkage [14]. In the presented scheme, in any normal case 
the signature has to be retrieved and checked by the specific recipient. Afterwards, the 
recipient reveals the ordinary signature for verification purpose, if in any case the signer 
would repudiate the signature. The Tseng et al.‟s scheme consists of 4 phases namely 
System initialization, signature generation, message recovery and conversion phases. The 
following diagram illustrates the signature generation and message recovery phases of the 
existing scheme.  
0
1
1 2
           ( )                    ( )
make r =0
select a random integer ( )
. ( ) mod
( .... )
( , , (
a b
k
i i i b
n
Alice U Bob U
k GF q
r M h r y p
r h r r r
R h M r h



  
 

1 2
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k
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 
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                                                                                confirm '
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i
r h r r
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M

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1
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                                                                                ( , , (( y mod p))mod q
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
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Figure 3: Flow chart for the signature generation phase and message recovery phase [1] 
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System Initialization phase 
These are the parameters used in the existing system. Let p  be a large prime, q be a large 
prime factor of 1,  p g  be a generator with an order q   in galois field, ( )GF p , and let (.)h  
be a one-way hash function. Each user iU  has a secret key 
*
i qx Z . Each user then 
calculates his own corresponding public key using the equation modi
x
iy g p . Let aU  be 
the sender 1,  p g and bU   be the receiver. 
Signature generation phase 
Let us consider that the sender, aU  is interested in delivering a large message M  to the 
particular receiver, bU . Let us assume that the message M  is divided into small message 
blocks in the sequence 1 2, ,  . . . , nM M M , where  iM GF p . After this,  aU  executes the 
following steps for creating the signature blocks for the corresponding message blocks 
 1 2, ,  . . . , nM M M .  
Step I:    Let 0 0r   and choose a random integer    k GF q . 
Step II:  Compute  1 . ( ) 
k
i i i br M h r y modp   for all i = 1,2,. . . ,n, where " "  refers to the   
exclusive operator. 
Step III: Compute 1 2( || |  . . .| || )nr h r r r , where „„||‟‟ refers to concatenation operator. 
Step IV:  Compute     ,  ,     kR h M r h g mod p mod q . 
Step V:   Compute  
            –   .aS k Rx mod q                                                                                   (1) 
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aU  sends the generated blocks of signature  1 2, ,  ,  ,  ,  . . ,  nR S r r r r  to the recipient bU  
through an open transmission medium. ir  is the message linkage parameter in between the 
     1  &
th thi i  blocks of message. 
 
Message recovery phase 
Once the signature blocks are received, ie;  1 2, ,  ,  ,  ,  . . ,,  b nR S r r r rU  can retrieve the 
original blocks of message  1 2, ,  . . . , nM M M  by executing these steps: 
Step I: Compute 0 1 2 1 . . . . . .( || || || )n nr h r r r r   and check whether '  r r  or not. If it 
matches proceed to next step. 
Step II: Retrieve the original blocks of message  1 2, ,  . . . , nM M M   in the given way: 
  11 .   ) ,(  
bxS R
i i i aM r h r g y mod p

                                                                             (2) 
for all   1,2,. . . ,i n  as well as 0  0.r  . 
Step III: Verification of the signature should be done using this equation: 
  
1
,    :),  ) 
bxS R
aR h M r h g y mod p mod q

                                                               (3) 
If it is matching, then the signature is considered valid and then conversion is done. 
Conversion phase 
If the signer, aU  is found repudiating the signature, then then receiver, bU  is capable to 
prove the dishonesty of aU  by just exposing the ordinary signature  , ,  R S r  generated for 
message  M . Using this ordinary signature which we got from converting the original 
signature, anybody can validate it using Eq. (3). So, let us prove the correctness of the 
existing scheme: 
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1
1
1
1
1
1
In message recovery phase, the receiver U  recovers the message using . (2).
Proof . According to . (2), we have
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



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In conversion phase, the ordinary signature is verified using . (3).
Proof . According to . (3), we have
( , , ( mod )),
 ( , , ( mod )),
 ( , , ( mod )),  
 ( , , ( mod )),
 
a
S R
a
k Rx R
a
k R R
a a
k
Eq
Eq
h M r h g y p
h M r h g y p
h M r h g y y p
h M r h g p
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Security analysis of the Tseng et al. scheme 
The existing scheme is similar to the digital signature scheme when security is considered. It 
is very difficult in finding solution to a discrete logarithmic problem [4.6] and a one-way 
hash function [9]. The security of the existing scheme is primarily based upon these two 
features which it imbibes. Let us take into consideration some common possible attacks 
against the existing scheme and try to analyze how the scheme responds to theme and how it 
withstands the attacks. 
The existing scheme is successful in providing all the four functions of security i.e 
confidentiality, non-repudiation, integrity and authentication. In this section we will see how 
the existing scheme will satisfy the above mentioned attributes: 
Attack 1: Eve already has information of one of the small message blocks iM  and thus he 
attempts for obtaining the common key b
x
ay  and in turn the rest of the message blocks. 
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Analysis of attack 1: Eve can compute the equation 1
1    ( ) .    
k
i b i ih r y M r mod p

   . Let us 
consider that he can get the value of kby , which goes to show that 
bx
ay  can be derived using  
   b
x
k S R
b ay g y mod p . In any case, breaking the one way hash function and getting the 
value of kby  is very difficult. Eve can never be able to obtain the rest of the blocks of 
message using Equation 2 because of non-availability of the value of kby . 
Attack 2: Eve tries to get the secret key, ix  of the user from all the available information 
publicly. 
Analysis of attack 2: Let us assume, Eve intends to get the aU ‟s private key ax  using the 
corresponding public key of aU ,   
x
a ay g mod p . It is very difficult because of usage of 
discrete logarithms. Hence to get aU ‟s secret key ax  is highly impossible. Eve cannot get  
secret key of aU , ax  simply from exisiting signature using Equation 1, because we already 
know that  Equation 1 has two unknown variables namely k  and ax . As we can see, even k  
is based upon discrete logarithmic problem as well as one-way hash function. 
Attack 3: Eve tries to forge the ordinary converted signature so as to pass Equation 3. 
Analysis of attack 3: It‟s not so easy to determine R and r, given S, as we already know that 
discrete logarithm values as well as one-way hash function are quite difficult to be solved as 
we can observe from equation 3. Just similar to this, suppose R and r are given, then it is 
also highly infeasible to derive the value of S in such a way that it satisfies Equation 3. 
Attack 4: Eve tries to forge the signature blocks delivered by Alice. 
Analysis of attack 4: Eve should have information of the key kby  in order to build up the 
signature to satisfy the equation 2. Eve would encounter lot of difficulty just similar to 
Attack 1. 
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Attack 5: Eve attempts to verify the authenticated encryption signature before even 
converting it. 
Analysis of attack 5: Eve badly needs the message, M in order to perform the verification of 
authenticated encryption signature in Equation 3. Eve will not be able to retrieve the 
message block 
iM , just as in case of Attack 6. Hence, there is no possibility of verification 
of the signature. 
Attack 6: Eve tries to retrieve a small message block 
iM  from the encrypted signature. 
Analysis of attack 6: Eve can retrieve message block, iM  from Equation 2, only if he has 
the secret key of either bob or Alice i.e. ax  or bx . It‟s quite difficult to break the discrete 
logarithm problem and find out the secret key of user, just as in case of Attack 1. 
Attack 7: Eve tries to modify, reorder and replicate or remove the blocks of message. 
Analysis of attack 7: The signature      ,  ,     kR h M r h g mod p mod q  will undergo a 
change if Eve modifies, reorders, replicates or deletes even one of the signature blocks. 
Since, the relation 1 2( || ||   . . . . || )nr h r r r  is not going to exist any more, the signature 
blocks can never pass the verifying equations. Hence, the changes will be definitely detected 
by the recipient. 
Setup 
The parameter 1 of security when given as input to the setup algorithm, the public 
parameters are formed by the following results. 
Let, , :q p  two prime numbers, which are large, in such a way that the q is a prime divisor of 
(p – 1) . Let g be an element of *pZ   of the order, q. 
*{ }: 0,1   :qH Z   It is a collision resistant one-way hash function. 
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q 
 
p 
Key generation function 
The  KeyGen algorithm  generates  the  public and  secret  key pairs  of signer and receiver. 
Bobs Public key modBxBy g p . 
Bobs Private  Key *
Bx Z  
Alice‟s Public key modaxAy g p  
Alice‟s Private  Key  *
ax Z    
 
 
 
Mathematical preliminaries 
We used the following basic notation,  definitions and models used throughout this thesis. 
  Notation and terminology 
All the discussed groups in the project are considered abelian groups. Groups of prime order 
have useful properties and are widely used in cryptography. All groups of prime order are 
cyclic. If there exists an element  g G , group G is considered cyclic. For each 0   ,g G  
there exists an integer a with 0  .ag g  Such an element  g G  is referred to as generator of 
G. The integers field mod p is denoted as pZ , for any prime, p. The multiplicative cyclic 
group of all the non-zero elements in  the field of integers mod p, pZ  is denoted as Z [27]. 
Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) 
To be specific and more focused discrete logarithms are considered analogous to the normal 
ones group theoretically. If h and g are the elements of one finite cyclic group called G then 
a solution to the equation,  gx h  , let it be x, is referred to as discrete logarithm for the base 
g of h in G. Similarly, over the complex or real numbers, the simple logarithm, ( ),log a b  is a 
solution to the equation,   ax b . To be concise, if G is a finite group, the problem discrete 
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logarithm in group, G is the following computational problem:  given elements β and α in G, 
determine an integer x is considered in such a way that the equation, x   is satisfied, 
provided x exists [11]. 
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem 
If g is generator of a group (more specifically we are talking about the multiplicative group 
of any finite field) and x, y are randomly  choosen integers.  Let us consider one  group G of 
order q, where G is cyclic. Then the Computational Diffie Hellmen method says that, if 
given a set ( ), ,a bg g g  for any randomly choosen generator, say g and , 0,..., }1{a b q   it is 
incompatible computationally to compute the x, y values [6]. This is the Computational 
Diffie-Hellmen problem. 
The Integer Factorization Problem 
Definition: Given an integer n which is positive, the problem of integer factorization says 
that to find its prime factorization, we need to use the equation 1 2
1 2 ..
e e ek
nn p p p . Here, pi is a 
distinct prime and each ei  ≥ 1. 
 
Safe Primes 
        
These primes are also known as safe primes because they have a very good relation with the 
stronger ones. Let q be a number that is a prime, then it is considered a strong prime 
whenever q-1 and q+1 will possess large prime factors. For a safe prime, the equation q = 2p 
+ 1 should satisfy, then p is considered to be a large prime factor according to the equation. 
Since the safe primes are used extensively in discrete logarithmic techniques such as Diffie 
Hellmen key exchange, they are considered very important especially in the field of 
cryptography. [23]. 
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CHAPTER III: PROPOSED CONVERTIBLE AUTHENTICATED 
ENCRYPTION SCHEME WITH MESSAGE LINKAGES 
In this chapter we propose a convertible authenticated encryption scheme with message 
linkages based upon the previous scheme, but with improved computational cost and 
communication overheads. 
Proposed Scheme 
Let us have a look at the four phases in our proposed scheme. They are namely system 
initialization, signature generation, message recovery, and conversion phases. The Figure 3 
representing the signature generation phase and message recovery phase and description of 
individual phases is given below. 
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Figure 4: Flow chart for the signature generation and message recovery phase of proposed 
scheme.  
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System initialization phase 
Let, p be a large prime number, q be large prime factor of (p – 1). Let g be one of the  
generators with order q in galois field, GF(p). Let, H be one-way hash function in our 
scheme. Let, aU  be the sender and bU be the receiver. The Secret key of aU  is ax , public 
key of aU  is ay . Secret key of  bU  is bx  and the respective public key is mod
bx
by g p . 
Signature Generation Phase 
Assume that the Alice, aU  sends a large message, M to Bob, bU . Here, the message M  is 
composed of a sequence  1 2 , ,  . . . . ,  ,nM M M , where  .iM GF p  aU  performs the 
given operations in order to generate the blocks of signature for M . 
Step I : Sets 0  0r   and chooses V  in random from 
*
qZ . 
Step II : Compute   Vl g mod p . 
Step III : Computes 1( . )i i ir M H r l   
              
 2                                                                          (1)
                                                   
  ,  
    
,  . . .
       
 . ,  
           
nr H n r r                                                                    
                                                                                             ) (  2aS x v l mod q    
So, aU  uses the public medium to send the blocks of signature  1 2,  ,  ,  ,  ,  . . . ,  nl S r r r r  
safely to Bob, bU . Here, ir is the message linkage parameter in between    1  
th than idi   
block of message. 
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Message recovery phase 
Once the signature blocks,  1 2 1 ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  . . . ,  n nl s r r r r r  are received Ub can retrieve the small 
blocks of message  1 2 ,  ,  . . . , nM M M as per the below given steps. 
Step I : Computes  1 2  ,  ,  . . . ,  nr H r r r   as well as checks iff   r r  . 
Step II : Using the equation below, verifies the encrypted signature. 
 .  . S lag y l g  If the above condition satisfies, then the signature is a valid one. 
Step III : Recovers the small blocks of message  1 2 ,  ,  . . . , nM M M in the following way: 
1
1 . ( ) i i iM r H r l

   for all 0  1,  2,  . . . ,     0.i n and r   
Correctness 
( )  .  . .  . .  .  . S x v l x v l x l l la a a
v
a
v
ag g g g g g g y g g y l g
       . 
Comparision 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison between existing and proposed scheme 
 Tseng Et Al‟s Scheme Proposed Scheme 
Signature Generation 3H + 2M + 2E 2H + M + E 
Message Recovery 4H + 2M + 5E + I 2H + 3M + E + I 
    
Security analysis of the proposed scheme 
Our new scheme is found to be as secure as the existing one. The security of all the previous 
schemes depends upon the complexity in breaking discrete logarithms [4, 6] and one-way 
hash function [9]. We shall assume common security attacks against the scheme proposed by 
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us and hence we shall prove that our scheme can pass all those possible security attacks 
which the existing scheme could do. 
As we have already seen that our scheme would provide 4 notion of security i.e. non-
repudiation, confidentiality, integrity and authentication. In this section, we shall observe 
how our proposed scheme is going to satisfy all the four attributes: 
Attack 1: Eve already has information of one of the small message blocks iM  and thus he 
attempts for obtaining the common key l  and in turn the rest of the message blocks. 
Analysis of attack 1: Eve can compute the equation 11    .(  )   i i ih r l M r mod p

   . Let us 
consider that he can get the value of l , which goes to show that b
x
ay  can be derived using  
   b
xk
by mod pl . In any case, breaking the one way hash function and getting the value of 
l  is very difficult. Eve can never be able to obtain the rest of the blocks of message using 
Equation 2 because of non-availability of the value of l . 
Attack 2: Eve tries to get the secret key, ix  of the user from all the available information 
publicly. 
Analysis of attack 2: Let us assume, Eve intends to get the aU ‟s private key, ax  using the 
respective public key of aU ,   
x
a ay g mod p . It is very difficult because of usage of discrete 
logarithms. Hence to obtain aU ‟s secret key ax  is highly impossible. Eve cannot get aU ‟s 
secret key, ax  simply from the signature using Equation 1, because we already know that  
Equation 1 has two unknown variables namely k   and ax . As we can see, even k  is based 
upon the discrete logarithmic problem and the one-way hash function. 
Attack 3: Eve tries to forge the ordinary converted signature so as to pass Equation 3. 
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Analysis of attack 3: Given S, it‟s not so easy to determine r as we already know that  
discrete logarithm values and one-way hash function are quite difficult to be solved as we 
can observe from equation 3. Just similar to this, suppose r is given, then it is also highly 
infeasible to derive the value of S in such a way that it satisfies Equation 3. 
Attack 4: Eve tries to forge the signature blocks delivered by Alice. 
Analysis of attack 4: Eve should have information of the key l  in order to build up the 
signature to satisfy the equation 2. Eve would encounter lot of difficulty just similar to 
Attack 1. 
Attack 5: Eve attempts to check the authenticated encryption signature before even 
converting it. 
Analysis of attack 5: Eve badly needs the message, M in order to perform the verification of 
authenticated encryption signature in Equation 3. Eve will not be able to retrieve the 
message block iM , just as in case of Attack 6. Hence, there is no possibility of verification 
of the signature. 
Attack 6: Eve tries to retrieve a small message block iM  from the encrypted signature. 
Analysis of attack 6: Eve can retrieve the message block, iM  from Equation 2, only if he has 
the secret key of either bob or Alice i.e. ax  or bx . It‟s quite difficult to break discrete 
logarithmic problem and find out the secret key of user, just as in case of Attack 1. 
Attack 7: Eve tries to modify, reorder and replicate or remove the blocks of message. 
Analysis of attack 7: The signature will undergo a change if Eve modifies, reorders, 
replicates or deletes even one of the signature blocks. Since, the relation 
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1 2( || ||   . . . . || )nr h r r r  is not going to exist anymore the signature blocks can never pass 
the verifying equations. Hence, the changes will be definitely detected by the recipient. 
Attack 8: Eve attempts to select the cipher text, delivers it to Alice, and in return gets the 
respective plaintext or some part thereof. 
Analysis of attack 8: It is well known that a plain RSA is susceptible to CCA Attacks, but in 
this algorithm, we have a random component introduced which ensures that it is no more a 
plain RSA. Also, for decryption of any message, Eve needs the private key  ax  or bx . But, 
breaking the Discrete Logarithm and getting the private key is very difficult. Hence, it is 
resistant to CCA attacks. 
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CHAPTER IV: IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
The proposed scheme is implemented in Java using java.security package.  We have taken 
input as different size of messages and time for the generation of signature and  retrieval of 
message is compared for different message sizes.  Here are some screen shots of the output 
of our program: 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Screenshot  of the output for message at the Alice‟s Site 
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Figure 6:  Screenshot  of the output for message at the Bob‟s Site
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 In this thesis, we propose a better convertible authenticated encryption scheme with lesser 
computational cost and communication overhead. This scheme preserves all the required 
security properties such as integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, etc. 
Though modifications were made, the previous advantages and strengths were kept intact 
without any compromise. Also, our scheme reduces the communicational overheads as well 
as the computational costs to further extent both in receiver and sender side. 
In future  research can be done on our scheme to further lower its computation cost and 
communication  overhead.  Also research can be done to incorporate  this feature  to  some 
of the  highly  proved  secured  encryption schemes  which  can be applicable  to highly 
security  sensitive  application  such as e-cash, e-bidding,  e-voting,  e- transactions etc. 
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